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ABSTRACT 
We explore the informational value of credit default swaps and the extent to which they may be 
linked to financial crises. After developing a theoretical framework to model the relationship 
between credit default swap market and equity and currency markets, we apply an empirical 
study which uses logistic regressions and a panel data sample of emerging markets to assess the 
ability of these financial instruments to predict crises. Regarding them as reflections of future 
expectations of investors on the outcomes of currency and equity markets, we find credit default 
swaps to be a significant indicator explaining the periods proceeding financial crises, at least in 
equity markets. The inclusion of credit default swaps as a factor in models that predict crises and 
their ability to improve predictions in equity market is a major contribution of this study to the 
existing literature.  
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Introduction 
Credit default swaps have been all around the news on the current financial crisis. Economists, 
investors, politicians and almost everyone seemed to agree that these financial instruments 
contain important information that can be used to gauge the financial situation during the current 
financial crisis. An article in Wall Street Journal on Oct 31, 2008 reports: 
 “Investors raise their bets on defaults in EU Countries implying that euro-zone economy 
heads into recession as costly bank-bailout plans could drive some European governments to 
default on their debt… Soaring [credit default] swap prices have preceded real calamity. 
Investor fears about the health of Wall Street firms like Bear Stern Cos. And Lehman Brothers 
Holding Inc. appeared in swap prices early on and contributed to capital flights that left the 
firms seeking government help… Credit default swaps have proven themselves a reliable 
indicator of trouble ahead.” 
However, can we say that an increase in credit default swap prices implies trouble in the near 
future for the reference entity? This question prompted us to explore the informational value of 
credit default swaps and the extent to which they may be linked to financial crises. Specifically, 
we investigate the ability of fluctuations in these premiums to predict the occurrence of financial 
crises.    
The analysis explores the ability of credit default swaps to predict stock market and currency 
market crises. The hypothesis is that CDS premiums reflect future expectations of investors on 
outcomes in currency and equity markets. The premium allows for a clear view of investor 
perception of risk. Logistic models with panel data from emerging markets are used to assess the 
crises predictive power of premiums written on sovereign obligations of emerging markets. We 
check the effect on both stock and currency markets.  
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to use credit default swap premiums in predicting 
financial crises. However, other factors which were created to reflect investor sentiment have 
been previously used. In principle financial crises should be preceded by periods of increased 
risk aversion among investors. Curdert and Gex (2007) test whether some main risk aversion 
indexes are able to predict crises. They find that “risk appetite” tends to decrease prior to 
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financial crises. Also, they do not fail to mention that the opposite case is possible. Crises may 
follow after periods of strong “risk appetite” during which investors are excessively optimistic 
and hence create “speculative bubbles” on the prices of risky assets. The recent mortgage crisis is 
an example of increased investor “risk appetite” prior to crises. According to their findings, risk 
aversion indicators had more predictive ability in stock market crises then currency crises.  
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the market for credit default swaps 
and establishes a theoretical basis for relationship between CDS premiums, equity prices and 
currency trends. Section 3 summarizes the literature on financial crises prediction. Section 4 
presents the model specification and the definition of crises. Section 5 describes the panel data. 
Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The credit default swap (CDS) market is the largest market of credit derivatives. In a CDS 
transaction, the protection buyer pays a series of fixed periodic payments (CDS premium) to the 
protection seller in exchange for a contingent payment in case of a credit event, such as 
bankruptcy, credit downgrade or a failure to make the scheduled payments. Duffie (1999) 
explains that the CDS premium is equivalent to swapping the payments from a risky security for 
the payments of a risk-free security in exchange of a contingent payment in case the risky 
security defaults. Hence, the premium reflects the credit risk of the underlying asset and is 
normally quoted in basis points over a reference rate, supposed to be a risk-free rate.  
CDSs are actively traded on corporate bonds and sovereign debt. This paper focuses on emerging 
markets where most contracts reference sovereign obligations. Sovereign CDSs are considered to 
be the most liquid credit derivative instruments in emerging markets. The usual contract is 
written on notional amounts of $10 million with a five-year maturity. For instance, a 5 year CDS 
rate of 200 for a Bulgarian international bond means that it costs $200 per annum to insure a 
$10,000 face value Bulgarian international bond.  
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Players in the emerging market CDSs use the contracts for a number of reasons. CDSs allow 
speculation on the future creditworthiness of countries. Also, they allow exploitation of arbitrage 
opportunities that may arise from the spread between CDS and the referenced bond. In addition, 
CDSs are used to manage the exposure to sovereign bonds. Participants in the market utilizing 
these opportunities range from hedge funds, mutual funds, banks to pension funds. Because of 
the players involved and the theory that follows, we assume that CDS premium reflects future 
expectations of the investors and the premium can be used to predict outcomes in currency and 
equity markets in emerging countries.  
Link to Currency Markets 
We discuss our theoretical basis for the effect of the changes in CDS premium on the probability 
of a currency crisis in the emerging markets. Let N be the notional amount of a contract, s be the 
CDS rate (premium) and p be the default probability of bond payments. Seeker of protection 
against default will buy the contract if the present value of premium payments will be equal or 
less than the present value of the expected loss from default:  
(1 ) (1 )
1 1
Ns p Np R
r r
− −≤
+ +
      (1) 
where R is the recovery rate in case of default and r is the interest rate. The above equation 
produces an expected default probability, set by investors, that is proportional to the premium 
paid: 
1
sp
s R
≤
+ −
      (2) 
where 1-R falls into [0,1]. According to (2), an increase in the CDS premium (s) at a fixed R, 
indicates an increased default probability on bond payments of the reference entity (p).  
In cases where the reference entity is sovereign debt, the increased default concern translates into 
a tendency of the currency to depreciate, as concluded by Cochrane (2004). The argument comes 
from fiscal theory and the theory of optimal distorting taxation. Chochrane uses the analogy of 
money as a stock in fiscal theory to establish a relation between currency devaluations and fiscal 
balances. From the theory of optimal distorting taxation, Chochrane argues that a currency crash 
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represents a choice by the government to devalue outstanding nominal debt rather than increase 
distortionary taxes. Hence, we expect an increase in the probability of currency crisis in a 
country when there is an increase in the CDS premium.  
Link to Stock Markets 
The theory for the effect of the changes in CDS premium on the probability of a stock market 
crisis is based on Merton’s (1974) model and its extension to sovereign debt by Chan-Lau & 
Kim (2004). First, Duffie (1999) notes that the yield from a holding a risky bond and paying a 
CDS premium, is equivalent to the yield from holding a risk-free bond. However, Chan-Lau & 
Kim (2004) observe that in practice the risk-free yield and the yield of a risky asset with CDS is 
not the same, because there is always a difference in bond spreads and CDS spreads evident in 
CDS-bond differential. The CDS-bond differential partly exists because of the different liquidity 
in the markets and the cheapest-to-deliver option premium in bonds. However, in the long-run, 
there should be a co-integration between bond spreads and CDS spreads.  
Merton’s model links bond and equity prices by taking a balance sheet approach. It argues that if 
the value of a firm’s assets falls below the face value of its debt, the firm defaults. Also, there is 
a positive correlation between bond and equity prices, and hence equity prices and bond spreads 
move in opposite direction. Chan-Lau & Kim (2004) extend the model to include sovereign 
obligations as equivalents of the firms’ debt.  
From the CDS-bond differential and the relationship between equity prices and bond spreads, we 
infer that CDS spreads and equity prices move in opposite directions. Furthermore, we use CDS 
as a source of information for investor expectations in country’s equity market, from our 
assumption that CDSs reflect future market expectations. So, we expect a positive relationship 
between changes in CDS premium and the probability of a crisis in stock markets.  
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3. Literature review 
The idea underlying the empirical research of crises prediction is to identify some factors that 
show specific patters prior to periods of crises. The goal is to build a system that assesses the 
probability of crises at a specific time horizon, taking into consideration all information available 
at the time of prediction. There are three methodological approaches used in literature on 
currency and stock market crises. The first approach does not concentrate on the factors that 
caused the crisis but rather wants to analyze the effects of crisis on some specific sector of the 
economy. An example is Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), who examine the implications of 
1995 crises and try to answer the question of why some emerging markets were hit by the crises 
while others not.  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) devise a methodology called a “signal approach” to identify the 
periods where a crisis will occur. Numerous papers follow this method which looks for any 
pattern in individual variables prior to crisis. When a pattern is found (e.g. a deviation from mean 
up to a certain threshold) a signal is issued by the variable tested. The threshold is chosen so as to 
minimize the false signals. The advantage of this approach is that it produces easily 
understandable results for policy purposes. However, it ignores the interaction between 
independent variables and standard statistical tests cannot be applied.  
This paper follows the third approach which eliminates some of the disadvantages of the signal 
approach by using a limited dependent variable. The method uses a logistic function to evaluate 
the overall effect of the explanatory variables and predict an outcome, i.e. the probability of the 
crises, constrained by zero and one. Kumar et al (2003) use a logistic model to study currency 
crises in 32 developing countries for a period of 15 years.  
Factors suggested by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and used in this paper to predict 
currency crises are: terms of trade, real interest rate, current account deficit, unemployment rate, 
GDP growth, changes in consumer prices, and returns in stock market indices. For the stock 
market, factors used in this paper and suggested by Boucher (2004) and also used by Curdert and 
Gex(2007) are price earnings ratio, stock returns and real interest rates.  
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The theory of financial crises suggests that economic fundamentals are the main cause of the 
financial crises. By economic fundamentals, we mean macroeconomic factors such as GDP 
growth, unemployment, inflation etc. The exact timing of the crises was first linearly determined 
and the crises had been predictable with economic fundamentals. Kaminsky and Lizondo (1996) 
specify models that predicted crises by using economic fundamentals in a non-linear fashion.  
However, economic fundamentals were not the only leading indicators of the crises. Investor 
behavior and other political and geographic factors were also taken into consideration. This 
paper argues for the inclusion of CDS premiums alongside economic fundamental factors to 
improve the predictability of the crises.  
4. Definition of Crises and Model Specification 
To test whether sovereign credit default swaps are a leading indicator of financial crises, we 
construct three models in stock markets and currency markets respectively. The first model is 
referred to as the “base” model and includes variables usually used in the literature to predict 
crises. The second model adds to the base model changes in CDS premiums, and will be 
indicative of the ability of the sovereign CDS to improve the forecasts of the existing models. It 
does so by checking the significance of the factor in presence of other factors currently used. The 
third model has changes in CDS premiums as the only independent variable. The dependent 
variable used is a qualitative variable while the independent variables are exogenous quantitative 
variables. Therefore, non-linear models are used to link the crisis prediction indicators as the 
dependent variables to the changes in CDS premiums and other quantitative variables as the 
independent variables.  
Periods of crises are identified by constructing an indicator (Crisisi,t), which is used as the 
dependent variable in the model. The indicator takes the value of 1 if there was a crisis within 
past 6 months and a value of 0 otherwise. In the regression models that follow, we estimate the 
probability that the crisis indicator is equal to 1 in a six-month horizon in both currency market 
and stock market of the emerging countries under consideration. Next, we define crises in 
currency and stock markets and then explain the regression methodology.  
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Definition of Crises  
Currency Market 
Following Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 1996, Kaminski, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and 
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), our models specify a currency crisis when there is a 
simultaneous increase in currency depreciation and foreign exchange reserves losses. As a 
convention in literature, a currency pressure index is constructed by the following formula: 
( ), ,, , ,/i t i ti t i t E R i tcpindex E Rσ σ= ∆ − ∆      (3) 
where ∆Ei,t measures the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate in terms of dollars, ∆Ri,t 
measures the change in the country’s foreign reserves, and ( ), ,/i t i tE Rσ σ  is the ratio of standard 
deviations. The index has an advantage of being able to analyze speculative attacks on currencies 
under both fixed and flexible exchange rate systems. An increase in the reserves reflects foreign 
currency inflows and lowers the pressure on depreciation of the local currency because of the 
negative sign in the equation. So, ,i tcpindex   measures the depreciation pressure of a currency. 
We define a currency crisis when the pressure of a currency goes beyond a certain threshold. In 
empirical studies, the threshold used falls between one and three standard deviations above the 
mean of the index. This paper uses the following formula to identify the crisis periods: 
, ,,
,
1,   if  2.0
0,  
i t i ti t cpindex cpindex
i t
cpindex
crisis
otherwise
µ σ≥ +
= 
                    (4) 
where ,i tcrisis  is the crisis indicator of country i at time t, ,i tcpindexµ is the sample mean of the 
pressure index and 
,i tcpindex
σ is the standard deviation of the pressure index. With a threshold of 
two standard deviations above the mean, a total number of 24 crises are identified. Table 3 in 
Appendix shows frequencies of crises and tranquil periods in the respective countries.  
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Stock Market 
To identify the crises periods in stock markets, we follow Mishkin and White (2002) definition 
of stock market crisis as falls in price of an index below some threshold during a specified period 
of time. We take the threshold to be 25 percent and the period to be 6 months.  Country’s main 
stock market indexes have been used as indicators of the stock market situation. Table 2 in 
Appendix shows the stock market indices used for respective countries. We use the following 
formula to identify crises in the emerging stock markets: 
( ), . 6
,
1,   if  / 1 0.25
0,  
i t i t
i t
P P
crisis
otherwise
−

− <= −
= 
    (5) 
where ,i tcrisis  is the stock market crisis indicator of an emerging country denoted by i at time t, 
,i tP  is the price of the index at time t while . 6i tP −  is the price of the index six months ago. The 
formula considers a crisis to be a drop in the index of more than a quarter of its value six month 
ago.  Using the above definition, we identify a total number of 38 crises in our sample data.  
Table 3 in Appendix shows frequencies of crises and tranquil periods in respective countries.  
 
Model Specification 
Three models are tested to see whether changes in sovereign credit default swaps improve 
forecasts in emerging stock markets and currency crises respectively. The base model includes 
variables usually used in literature of predicting crises in emerging markets. The second model 
adds changes in sovereign CDS premiums to the base model, while the third tests the 
significance of a model which includes only changes in CDS premiums as explanatory variable. 
Variables in all three models are lagged by one month to check the predictability a crisis a month 
in advance. In all the regression models for both markets, we use a logistic function of the type:  
1( )
1 1
x
x x
ef x
e e−
= =
+ +
.      (6) 
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The first model uses the following logistic regression model to estimate the probability of a crisis 
in stock and currency markets of emerging countries within a one-month horizon by regressing 
the indicator on variables commonly used in literature: 
, , 1
1
Pr( 1)
n
k
i t k i t
k
crisis f Xα β
−
=
 
= = +  ∑       (7) 
where α and β  are the coefficients while , 1ki tX −  are the variables used in past studies on the 
field. For currency crises model, the variables used are: real interest rate, terms of trade, current 
account, unemployment rate, GDP growth, inflation and one month stock returns. However, 
there is not as much literature that addresses stock market crises as there is for currency crises. 
We use the same factors as in Curdert and Gex(2007) for stock market crises model, namely: 
price earnings ratio of the indices, one month stock returns and real interest rates.  
The second model extends the first model by adding changes in sovereign CDS premiums as a 
factor predicting crises in emerging markets. The following equation is estimated:  
, , 1 1 , 1
1
Pr( 1) ( )
n
k
i t k i t n i t
k
crisis f X CDSα β β
− + −
=
= = + + ∆∑        (8) 
where , 1 , 1 , 2( / ) 1i t i t i tCDS CDS CDS− − −∆ = −  is the lagged one-month change in sovereign CDS 
premiums on the international bonds of the emerging countries considered in this paper. Here, 
fluctuations in CDS are regressed on the presence of other factors used in the first model in order 
to check its ability to improve the forecasts.  
The third model uses the following logistic regression equation to estimate crises probabilities by 
using changes in sovereign CDS premiums as the only factor: 
, , 1Pr( 1) ( )i t i tcrisis f CDSα β −= = + ∆      (9) 
where , 1 , 1 , 2( / ) 1i t i t i tCDS CDS CDS− − −∆ = −  is the lagged one-month change in sovereign CDS 
premiums as in the second model.  
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5. Data 
The dataset consists of 21 emerging market countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Croatia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey. We use panel data with 
monthly frequencies starting from the date when CDS quotes were available for the respective 
reference country until August 2008. We used Bloomberg terminal to retrieve stock market index 
levels, P/E ratios of indexes and 5 year sovereign credit default swap premiums whereas IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics database was used to retrieve other variables.  
The choice of independent variables in both markets was based on earlier studies, and the 
variables were earlier found to be related to currency and stock market crises respectively. Some 
variables needed to be created from the retrieved series. In stock markets, six month stock return 
series were created by using the index price series obtained from Bloomberg. In currency 
markets, following Kaminsky et al (1998), we created terms of trade as the ratio between exports 
and imports. Table 1 in Appendix summarizes the independent variables and their sources.  
We used linear interpolation to convert the annually and quarterly data observations into monthly 
frequencies. The variables converted were: GDP growth, current account and unemployment 
rate. However, in cases where data with lower frequency was available for some countries on 
these series, we retrieved the lower frequency data. For the monthly series, the last day of the 
month is used. 
By correlation coefficients, we checked whether CDS is showing information that is already 
contained in another variable. Table 5 in Appendix shows correlation matrices for both markets. 
The correlation coefficient that measures the relationship of CDS to other variables falls in the 
range of -0.063 (GDP growth) and 0.548 (Inflation). Any coefficient significantly different from 
1 and -1 shows that we cannot fit a linear relationship between those variables. Therefore, we 
argue that information contained in CDS is distinct from the one contained in other variables and 
hence, it can improve results.   
Panel data unit root test as suggested by Im et al. (2003) is applied to check whether we have 
stationary variables. The test rejected the null hypothesis that all series are non-stationary against 
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an alternative that all series are stationary at a 10 percent level of significance. Hence, the 
variables used in the regressions are trend stationary. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
Models specified in the methodology were regressed to estimate the variables that affect the 
probability of stock market crises and currency market crises in emerging markets. We used 
panel data with one month lagged independent variables. Because of the short time period of the 
data we possessed, we did only in-sample predictions. Table 6 in the Appendix shows the 
coefficients and marginal effects or slope coefficients of the factors supposed to affect the 
probability of the stock market crises. Table 7 in the Appendix presents the same regression 
results for the factors assumed to affect the probability of the currency crises. First, we discuss 
the results in both markets. Then, we explore the predictive ability of our models and finally, we 
compare the predictive power of models in stock and currency markets.  
In the stock market models, all three models proved to be significant. In the first model, the 
regression on the currently used factors in literature produced a pseudo squared-R of 0.059 and 
the model proved significant at a one percent confidence level. Unexpectedly, P/E ratios and real 
interest rates are insignificant in predicting stock market crises. In the second model, we improve 
the pseudo squared-R to 0.077 after adding the one month changes in the CDS premiums in the 
base model. One month changes in CDS premiums are statistically significant at one percent and 
improve forecasts of stock market crashes a month in advance in emerging markets. The factor 
has the expected positive sign, which reflects the assumption that ceteris paribus, an increase in 
premiums signals a higher probability of default in emerging stock markets. Also, changes in 
CDS premiums are significant also in the third model, when they are the only factor predicting 
crises. So, an increase in the default probability of bond payments by a country, which is derived 
from the credit default swap premium, can be interpreted as a factor signaling an increase in the 
probability of a stock market crisis in the same country.  
We do not have the same impressive results in currency markets. The regression on the factors 
currently used in literature produced a pseudo squared-R of 0.14 with GDP growth and inflation 
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failing to be statistically significant as leading indicators of currency crises. Ceteris paribus, 
increases in stock returns or real interest rates contribute to lower probability of currency crisis 
while increases in terms of trade, current account or unemployment rate signal a higher 
probability of currency crises. Changes in CDS premiums are statistically significant at 5 percent 
confidence level in the third model and they have the expected positive sign, where an increase 
in the premiums corresponds to a higher probability of currency crises. However, a test on the 
slope coefficient of changes in CDS premiums in the second model cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient is significantly different from zero. So, changes in CDS premiums 
are insignificant in presence of currently used factors in literature. Hence, the inclusion of the 
factor in the base model does not improve forecasts of currency crises in emerging markets.  
However, one cannot draw final results from conclusions by looking at the coefficients and 
marginal effects of the factors only. Statistics on predictive ability of our models should also be 
considered. To obtain meaningful statistics about predictions from our data-sample, we set a 
probability threshold above which, it is decided that the model predicts a crisis. Other studies 
choose a threshold that maximizes the share of correctly classified observations. We follow 
Peltonen (2006) and use four different probability thresholds. Table 8 and Table 9 in Appendix 
show statistics on predictive ability of our models for different probability thresholds.   
The statistics on the predictive ability of stock market crises show that the second model 
outperforms the base model by the share of correctly predicted crises at 0.1 and 0.15 probability 
threshold. The second model correctly predicts 27.27% and 33.33% while the base model 
predicts 21.05% and 16.67% of the crises at 0.1 and 0.15 thresholds respectively. At 0.25 
probability threshold, the base model predicts one crisis and makes no false alarm while the 
second and third models correctly predict two crises out of five. Adding CDS premium changes 
to the base model improves the predictive ability and at best, it predicts 40% of the crises.  
Changes in CDS premiums are statistically insignificant in the second model, and hence the 
predictive ability of the base model and the second model is the same. However, the CDS 
premiums are significant in the third model but underperform the base model in the predictive 
ability. The model does not predict any crises at a probability threshold of more than 0.1. At a 
threshold of 0.05, the third model correctly predicts only 4.76% of the crises while the base 
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model predicts 16.13%. At best, the base model correctly predicts 42.46% of the crises at 0.1 and 
0.15 probability thresholds.  
Looking at country-specific forecasts, the most successful prediction of a stock market crisis was 
for the Brazilian Bovespa index. Also, the model produced successful predictions for the Turkish 
stock market with the exception of predicted values for 2003. The worst results from the stock 
market model are for the Russian stock market index where we have a predicted crisis 
probability of more than 20 percent and yet there is no crisis as defined in this paper. Figure 1 in 
Appendix shows the graphs of forecasts for stock market crises by country.   
On the other hand, the most successful prediction of a currency market crisis was for the South 
African Rand in 2003, although we don’t have a predicted crisis probability of more than 10 
percent for this currency. The worst result from the model that predicts currency crises was for 
the Chinese Renminbi. The model predicts a currency crash with more than 50 percent 
probability during the second quarter of 2008 although there is no crisis. Figure 2 in Appendix 
shows the graphs of forecasts for currency market crises by country.   
To sum up, changes in sovereign credit default swap premiums have statistically significant 
impact on the probability of stock market crises in emerging markets, while the same is not true 
for the currency crises. Credit default swaps alone were able to predict 40% of the stock market 
crises and 4.76% of the currency market crises.  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether changes in sovereign credit default swap 
premiums were able to predict stock market or currency market crises in emerging markets. The 
logistic regression results show that the one month change in a country CDS premium tends to 
increase one month ahead of a crisis in the stock market, while it does not have a significant 
implication for the currency market. Also, the predictive power was satisfactory for stock market 
crises. By contrast, these financial instruments were found to be insignificant in presence of other 
factors in explaining currency crises. The findings here confirm the results from Cudert and Cox 
(2007) that factors that measure investor sentiment have more predictive power in stock market 
crises than in currency crises. The inclusion of such a financial instrument as a factor in models 
that predict financial crises and its ability to improve predictions in stock market crises is the 
major contribution of this study in the existing literature. We established that fluctuations in CDS 
premiums signal trouble in stock markets.  
Recently, because of the critiques directed to the industry for the low level of transparency in the 
CDS market, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. has decided to publish quotes of CDS 
online and free for public. It will be interesting to see whether this move will have an effect on 
the crises predictive ability of these instruments in the future. This issue is beyond the scope of 
this study; however, the informational value of these financial instruments is without doubt 
immense.  
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Appendix 
Data Sources  
 
Table 1 
Data Sources and frequencies of the data as they were retrieved 
Variables for Stock Market Crises Index Source Frequency and Period 
Country's Main Stock Market Index Bloomberg Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Independent Variables in Stock Market Model Source Frequency and Period 
5 YR Credit Default Swaps in USD Bloomberg Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Price/Earnings Ratio of Index Bloomberg Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Stock Returns Bloomberg Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Real Interest Rates IMF IFS line 60 and 64.X Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Variables for Currency Market Crises Index Source Frequency and Period 
Exchange Rate National Currency per USD IMF IFS line AE Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Total Reserves Minus Gold IMF IFS line 1L.D Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Independent Variables in Currency Market Model Source Frequency and Period 
5 YR Credit Default Swaps in USD Bloomberg Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Gross Domestic Product IMF IFS line 99B Annual, 2000 - 2008
Current Account IMF IFS line 78ALD Annual, 2000 - 2008
Unemployment Rate IMF IFS line 67R Annual, 2000 - 2008
Terms of Trade Kaminsky et al (1998) Quarterly, 2000:9 - 2008:6
Country's Main Stock Market Returns Bloomberg Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Real Interest Rates IMF IFS line 60 and 64.X Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
Change in Consumer Prices IMF IFS line 64.X Monthly, 2000:10 - 2008:8
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Table 2 
List of countries with the respective stock market indexes and 
currencies and the starting date for CDS quotes 
Country Stock Market Index Currency CDS Start Date
Argentina Merval Argentinean Peso Jun-05
Brazil Bovespa Brazilian Real Oct-01
Bulgaria Sofix Bulgarian Lev Oct-00
Chile IPSA Chilean Peso Jan-03
China SSE Composite Chinese Renminbi Jan-03
Colombia IGBC Colombian Peso Jan-03
Croatia Crobex Croatian Kruna Oct-00
Hungary Bux Hungarian Forint Mar-02
India Sensex Indian Rupee Feb-05
Indonesia JSX Composite Indonesian Rupiah Jan-05
Israel TA-25 Israeli Shekel Sep-04
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Malaysian Ringgit Nov-01
Mexico IPC Mexican Peso Oct-01
Turkey ISE-100 National Index New Turkish Lira Oct-03
Peru IGBVL Index Peruvian Nuevo Sol Apr-02
Philippines PSEi Philippine Peso Dec-00
Poland WIG Polish Zloty Oct-00
Russia RTSi Russian Rubble Oct-00
South Africa JSE Index South African Rand Apr-02
South Korea Kospi 200 South Korean Won Apr-02
Thailand SET Index Thai Baht Oct-00
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Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 3 
Number of observations, frequency of crises and tranquil periods 
in both stock markets and currency markets categorized by country 
Country Obs. Crises Tranquil % Crises Crises Tranquil % Crises
Argentina 39 3 36 8.33% 0 39 0.00%
Brazil 83 0 83 0.00% 2 81 2.47%
Bulgaria 95 0 95 0.00% 8 87 9.20%
Chile 68 0 68 0.00% 0 68 0.00%
China 68 3 65 4.62% 6 62 9.68%
Colombia 68 2 66 3.03% 0 68 0.00%
Croatia 95 1 94 1.06% 2 93 2.15%
Hungary 78 0 78 0.00% 0 78 0.00%
India 43 0 43 0.00% 1 42 2.38%
Indonesia 43 1 42 2.38% 0 43 0.00%
Israel 49 0 49 0.00% 0 49 0.00%
Malaysia 82 2 80 2.50% 0 82 0.00%
Mexico 83 2 81 2.47% 0 83 0.00%
Peru 59 1 58 1.72% 2 57 3.51%
Philippines 77 1 76 1.32% 2 75 2.67%
Poland 95 3 92 3.26% 4 91 4.40%
Russia 95 2 93 2.15% 1 94 1.06%
South Africa 95 3 92 3.26% 0 95 0.00%
South Korea 95 0 95 0.00% 1 94 1.06%
Thailand 77 0 77 0.00% 0 77 0.00%
Turkey 77 0 77 0.00% 9 68 13.24%
Total 1564 24 1540 1.56% 38 1526 2.49%
Currency Market Stock Market
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of independent variables in markets 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Currency Crisis Indicator 1564 0.015345 0.1229612 0 1
Stock Market Crisis Indicator 1564 0.024297 0.1540179 0 1
Credit Default Swaps 1564 184.3084 279.9703 8.126 3790
Stock Market Index Prices 1544 9527.907 13094.89 71.85 72592.5
International Reserves 1564 61015.99 133356.5 3008.684 1083780
Terms of Trade 1564 1.061284 0.6944577 -1.17019 3.783082
Current Account 1564 7339.307 36095.73 -6023 371832.6
Unemployment Rate 1424 10.90729 8.035494 0.85 35.5905
GDP Growth 1337 0.043218 8.57E-02 -0.99916 3.30E-01
Inflation 1526 6.198945 7.474744 -1.2658 73.157
Stock Returns (one month) 1542 0.017599 0.0728043 -0.35386 0.541542
P/E Ratio of the Index 1182 20.24383 26.54271 1.84 580.28
Real Interest Rate 1353 4.055149 6.375249 -13.157 34.1197
 
 
Table 5 
Correlation matrices of variables used in stock market and 
currency market models. 
 
Stock Market
Return CDS Real Int Rate P/E Ratio
One Month Return 1
CDS -0.01 1
Real Interest Rate 0.0279 0.3433 1
Price/Earnings Ratio 0.0447 0.0825 -0.0821 1
Currency Market
CDS Terms CurrAccount Unemploy. Inflation Real Int Rate GDP Growth Return
CDS 1
Terms of Trade 0.0442 1
Current Account -0.0487 0.0426 1
Unemployment Rate 0.1371 0.3065 -0.1246 1
Inflation 0.548 0.1443 0.0569 -0.0367 1
Real Interest Rate 0.1129 0.0884 -0.1359 0.0699 -0.0454 1
GDP Growth -0.0639 0.0444 0.1508 -0.1015 0.023 0.0666 1
One Month Return 0.0049 0.0148 0.1609 -0.0249 0.0377 -0.0614 0.1201 1
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Regression Estimates 
 
Table 6 
Logit regressions on stock market crises prediction models 
Dependent variable: Crisis Indicator           
Independent variables (t-1): Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients Marginal Effects
Constant -3.505637*** -3.950127*** -3.973741***
[0.3481558] [0.2009473] [0.1925427]
Sovereign Credit Defalut Swaps .0008721*** 0.00000119*** 0.0010651*** .0000233***
[0.0003182] [0.00002] [0.0002776] [.00001]
P/E Ratio of Stock Markets -0.0005738 -6.79e-06 -.000612 -0.00000725
[0.0121172] [0.00014] [0.0121767] [0.00014]
Real Interest Rate -0.170696 -0.0020196 -.0334392 -0.0020251
[0.0560089] [0.00059] [0.0307316] [0.0006]
One Month Stock Returns -8.266678*** -0.0978076*** -8.640637*** -0.0978626***
[3.192179] [0.04138] [2.129019] [0.04142]
Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo squared-R
Chi-square
P-Value
-169.41479
0.0296
10.34
0.0013
Model (3)
1543
0.0773
26.89
0.0000
Model (1) Model (2)
1521 1521
-163.73714
0.0592
20.62
0.0000
-160.6004
 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, marginal effects give the 
estimated slope coefficient, coefficients are estimated for the original logistic model. 
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Table 7 
Logit regressions on currency market crises prediction models 
 
Dependent variable: Crisis Indicator         
Independent variables (t-1): Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients Marginal Effects
Constant -6.738983*** -6.487072*** -4.23099***
[1.077809] [1.086092] [0.2203864]
Sovereign Credit Defalut Swaps 0.8368797 0.0046655 1.63882** .0236229***  
[1.062977] [0.00602] [0.6597416] [0.00923]
Terms of Trade 0.8058111** 0.0046468 **   0.5876072** 0.0024199**
[0.3655891] [0.00215]  [0.3637605] [0.00172]
Current Account 0.0000107***  6.20e-08*** 8.91e-06*** 3.67e-08***
 [4.79e-06] [0.00000] [5.11e-06] [0.00000]
Unemployment Rate 0.0830174** 0.0004787** 0.0954109** 0.0003929**
[0.0354746] [0.0002] [0.0356845] [0.00018]
Change in Consumer Prices 0.0759931 0.0004382 0.1838124 0.000757
[0.0569267] [0.00036] [0.0814281] [0.00045]
Real Interest Rate -0.01649704 **  -0.0009513**    -0.1489212** -0.0006133**
[0.0788175] [0.00045] [0.0946067] [0.00039]
GDP Growth 3.375028  0.0194626 3.520752 0.0144992 
[4.032087] [0.0232] [4.609704] [0.01952]
One Month Stock Returns -8.855517* -0.0510666* -9.64336* -0.0397134*
[3.613523] [0.02639] [3.751803] [0.02234]
Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo squared-R
Chi-square
P-Value
30.48 27.25 4.87
0.0000 0.0006 0.0274
-90.690727 -69.647606 -120.9699
0.1439 0.1636 0.0197
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
1209 1080 1522
 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, marginal effects give the 
estimated slope coefficient, coefficients are estimated for the original logistic model. 
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Predictive Power and Crises Probabilities 
 
Table 8 
Forecasts of crises probabilities in currency market models 
Currency Market
Number of crises 
predicted
Crises Predicted 
Correctly False Alarms Sensitivity Specificity
Share of correctly 
classified obs.
Pr( D|  +) Pr(~D|  +) Pr( +|  D) Pr( -| ~D)
Model (1)
Threshhold
0.05 62 16.13% 83.87% 47.62% 95.62% 94.79%
0.1 7 42.86% 57.14% 14.29% 99.66% 98.18%
0.15 7 42.86% 57.14% 14.29% 99.66% 98.18%
0.25 5 40.00% 60.00% 9.52% 99.75% 98.18%
Model (2)
Threshhold
0.05 62 16.13% 83.87% 47.62% 95.62% 94.79%
0.1 7 42.86% 57.14% 14.29% 99.66% 98.18%
0.15 7 42.86% 57.14% 14.29% 99.66% 98.18%
0.25 5 40.00% 60.00% 9.52% 99.75% 98.18%
Model (3)
Threshhold
0.05 21 4.76% 95.24% 4.17% 98.66% 97.17%
0.1 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 99.93% 98.36%
0.15 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 98.42%
0.25 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 98.42%
 
Note: Crises predicted correctly were classified when there was a prediction that a crisis will happen and the crisis in fact happened. 
False alarms were considered when a crisis was predicted but it did not take place in reality. Sensitivity measures the percent 
probability of a crisis to have been predicted when a crisis happens. Specificity measures the probability that no crisis is predicted 
when no crisis is taking place. Share of correctly classified observations measures the percentage of correctly predicted situations in 
the market out of all the data points used.  D stands for “crises happening” while ~D is the opposite. + stands for “predicted crisis” 
while – stands for “no crisis predicted”.  
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Table 9 
Forecasts of crises probabilities in stock market models 
Stock Market
Number of crises 
predicted
Crises Predicted 
Correctly False Alarms Sensitivity Specificity
Share of correctly 
classified obs.
Pr( D|  +) Pr(~D|  +) Pr( +|  D) Pr( -| ~D)
Model (1)
Threshhold
0.05 112 12.50% 87.50% 37.84% 93.40% 92.04%
0.1 19 21.05% 78.95% 10.81% 98.99% 96.84%
0.15 6 16.67% 83.33% 2.70% 99.66% 97.30%
0.25 1 100.00% 0.00% 2.70% 100.00% 97.63%
Model (2)
Threshhold
0.05 93 11.83% 88.17% 29.73% 94.47% 92.90%
0.1 22 27.27% 72.73% 16.22% 98.92% 96.91%
0.15 9 33.33% 66.67% 8.11% 99.60% 97.37%
0.25 5 40.00% 60.00% 5.41% 99.80% 97.50%
Model (3)
Threshhold
0.05 23 8.70% 91.30% 5.41% 98.61% 96.37%
0.1 8 25.00% 75.00% 5.41% 99.60% 97.34%
0.15 7 28.57% 71.43% 5.41% 99.67% 97.41%
0.25 5 40.00% 60.00% 5.41% 99.80% 97.54%
 
Note: Crises predicted correctly were classified when there was a prediction that a crisis will happen and the crisis in fact happened. 
False alarms were considered when a crisis was predicted but it did not take place in reality. Sensitivity measures the percent 
probability of a crisis to have been predicted when a crisis happens. Specificity measures the probability that no crisis is predicted 
when no crisis is taking place. Share of correctly classified observations measures the percentage of correctly predicted situations in 
the market out of all the data points used.  D stands for “crises happening” while ~D is the opposite. + stands for “predicted crisis” 
while – stands for “no crisis predicted”.  
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Figure 1 
Graphs’ of model (2) forecasts for stock market crises by country. The blue bar shows the 
occurrence of a crisis as defined in this paper and the red line shows the estimated 
probability of a crisis by model(2).  
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Figure 2 
Graphs’ of model (2) forecasts for currency market crises by country. The blue bar shows 
the occurrence of a crisis as defined in this paper and the red line shows the estimated 
probability of a crisis by model(2).  
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
31 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
